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Abstract
Nepal has seen a significant reduction in poverty over the period 1995–2010 which encom-
passes the decade-long Maoist-led civil war. So was the post-conflict provision of economic
resources to districts related to their involvement in promoting the Maoist cause? We tackle
this question combining theory and empirics. Our model predicts that poorer districts are
more likely to support the Maoists and in return they get promised economic gains condi-
tional on the Maoists prevailing post-conflict. Combining data on conflict with consumption
expenditure data from the Nepal Living Standards Survey and data on foreign aid, we test
these predictions. Our panel data estimates and our cross-sectional analysis consistently find
strong support for our hypotheses. These are confirmed by the IV analysis that we perform
at the panel level.
JEL codes: D72, D78, O20
Keywords: Conflict, foreign aid, political economy, targeting.
1We are grateful to Matthew Embrey, B˚ard Harstad, Magnus Hatlebakk, Lakshmi Iyer, Tarun Jain,
Kalle Moene, Vikram Pathania, Oliver Vanden Eynde and various seminar and conference participants at
the University of Oslo, the 11th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development (ISI Delhi),
University of Essex, Indian School of Business (Hyderabad), University of Kent, Queen’s University Belfast,
Development Conference 2016 at Hiedelberg, PSE workshop on India-China, the 7th IBEO Political Economy
Workshop (Sardinia), the NEPS conference 2016 (Milan), the 11th Annual Conference on Public Policy and
Management (IIM Bangalore), Gothenburg University and the University of Sussex for useful comments and
to Kishore Gawande, Lakshmi Iyer and Francois Libois for sharing their data with us. We thank Sukanya
Honkote, Karan Javaji and Udit Khare for excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are solely ours.
Anirban Mitra: University of Kent; Shabana Mitra: Indian Institute of Management Bangalore.
1
1 Introduction
Civil wars have been studied by academics from various disciplines and from many different
angles. Given that civil wars have persisted over centuries in this world and have affected
millions of lives, this attention is quite justified. According to Miguel, Satyanath, and
Sergenti (2004), the toll civil wars have taken dwarf the casualties exacted by inter-state
wars since World War II. Even though sub-Saharan Africa has borne the brunt of civil wars
for decades now, this phenomenon is by no means restricted to that area. In recent years,
several countries in Asia too have witnessed civil conflict. We study the decade-long Maoist
uprising in Nepal (1996–2006) which eventually culminated in the abolition of monarchy in
2008 and brought the left parties considerable success in the elections that followed. Clearly,
this civil war resulted in strengthening multi-party democracy and reducing the erstwhile
powerful monarch to a titular head.
We are particularly interested in the following questions: (i) From which quarters did the
Maoist get the maximum support? Was it poorer areas or richer ones? Theoretically it
is far from clear. On one hand, the poor may sympathize more with the Maoist cause on
ideological grounds. On the other hand, a non-democratic setup where markets are regulated
by a government which does not enjoy popular support may not sit well with the rich.2 (ii)
Do the Maoists actually end up “rewarding” those who put their weight behind the Maoist
movement? Was there an implicit quid pro quo? (iii) Nepal witnessed a large reduction
in poverty levels over the period 1995-2010. However, the reduction was far from uniform
across the districts.3 Given that this period roughly coincides with the duration of the civil
war and the subsequent joining of the Maoist parties in the government, can one link this
differential poverty reduction to the putative “rewards” story raised in (ii)?
Our interest in analysing the situation in Nepal extends beyond understanding a particular
country’s experience. Our basic goal is to understand the mechanics of civil wars in general:
who supports the challenger and how they are rewarded (if at all). In particular, our interest
is in the fortunes of different groups subsequent to the cessation of the civil war ; thereby
our focus on the economic consequences of conflict. The civil conflict in Nepal is a context
amenable to studying such issues especially given that the challenger (the Maoist group)
achieved a large degree of political power after the hostilities ended. Clearly, any reason-
able approach to understanding the questions outlined above must account for the political
economy of the country under consideration.
We proceed by combining theory with empirical analysis. In our model, there are three key
sets of actors: the Maoist group, the king and the districts constituting the nation. By
construction, we have kept the districts identical in all respects but one: they have different
2Empirical studies suggest that the poorer districts witnessed greater conflict. See Do and Iyer (2010)
among others.
3See e.g. Mitra (Forthcoming).
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income distributions. In this way we are able to isolate the interplay between district-level
income and conflict. The game proceeds as follows: first the Maoists decide whether or not
they want to challenge the regime. If they do challenge, then both the Maoist group and the
king simultaneously decide on how hard to fight.4 Specifically, the Maoist group promises
(non-negative) transfers to the various districts which are to be delivered to them only if the
Maoist group prevails in the conflict. Thus, these transfers are the “rewards” conditional on
a Maoist victory. These transfers are to be financed out of a budget whose control lies with
the head of the government. The idea is that once the Maoists win the power of the king
will be heavily curtailed and the country will move to democracy.
The king has two instruments at his disposal. First, he can provide transfers to the districts
which become relevant in case the Maoist rebellion is defeated; this potentially serves to
dampen support for the Maoists. Secondly, he can use his finances to buy effort from his
army to combat the rebels.5 Notice, both these instruments have the ability to affect the
final outcome of conflict.6 Faced with these choices, the districts then decide individually
and simultaneously on their supply of effort for the Maoist group. Of course, choosing to
supply zero effort is possible and is interpreted as not supporting the Maoist group.7
We show that poorer districts contribute more effort to support the Maoists.8 Moreover, they
do so even when they are promised lower transfers as compared to their rich counterparts.
This is without any assumption of ideological affinities between them and the Maoists.9
Next, we are able to characterize different sets of equilibria: there is one where the king
opts for “no expropriation” (zero lump-sum transfers) and another where he sets positive
transfers for the districts. We then compare features regarding the intensity of conflict —
as a result of the efforts exerted by the two warring groups — across both sets of equilibria.
Finally, we show that although poorer districts may receive lower transfers in an absolute
sense they are gainers in a relative sense. This, in turn, suggests that districts with poverty
figures above the national average tend to converge towards the national average; this is
indicative of a non-uniform pattern of poverty reduction.
4We discuss an alternative sequence of moves in which K moves after the challenger, M , does. See section
2.3.4 for a detailed treatment.
5Think of this army as a private one who must be maintained at some expense to the king. Of course,
the upkeep of such an army may be financed by taxes on the districts; but then again this is money which
the king could potentially “consume” himself but chooses not to and implicitly uses it to “pay” his army.
The King of Nepal had mobilized about 80,000 Royal Nepalese Army with the aim of ending the Maoist
insurgency (see Sharma (2006)).
6This role of the incumbent (king) is similar in spirit to that of the political incumbent in ? where s(he)
is allowed to choose the degree of political contestability by deciding how much to spend on vote-buying,
bullying, or outright repression.
7We assume (as is standard) that the outcome follows from a contest success function whose inputs are
the aggregate conflict contributions from each side (the king and the Maoist group).
8This is consistent with several empirical studies on Nepal cited above.
9There is no ideology in our model. Assuming that poorer districts sympathize more with the Maoist
cause may be plausible but it would add no significant insights within our framework. This possibility is
discussed in an extension.
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We next examine these predictions with data from Nepal. Using data on conflict, data on
consumption expenditure from the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) and foreign aid
data, we created a district-level panel. We have data on consumption expenditure for the
pre-conflict period from the NLSS-I (conducted during 1995-96) and for the post-conflict
period we use the third wave of NLSS that was conducted in 2010-11. We combine these
with data on projects financed through foreign aid. These projects are mainly for the purpose
of a district’s infrastructural and economic development. This is what we primarily use as
our measure for transfers (“rewards”) to districts.
Using these data and performing both panel level and cross-sectional analysis, we consistently
find that districts which experienced higher levels of conflict during the decade-long Maoist
war were more likely to have a greater number of foreign aided projects in years after the
war even when controlling for the district-level poverty rate. Our results survive a series of
robustness checks: alternative measures of conflict, of poverty, of inequality. We split the
projects into seven broad categories and separately examined the results for each category.
By and large (with just a single exception), these sectoral regressions re-iterate our main
findings.
We also conduct a Two-Stages Least Squares (IV) analysis to check the robustness of our
findings. It is argued that one of the important sources of funds for the Maoists came from
the control of timber smuggling to India. We exploit this channel in terms of developing
an instrument for our conflict measure(s) at the district level. The ecology (specifically, the
elevation and vegetation) varies considerably across the different districts of Nepal. How-
ever, the type(s) of timber a district can offer is clearly a time-invariant entity. However, the
prices of these — in India — do vary over time. Thus, a weighted index of these prices at
the district-level — where the weights come from the proportion of the district vegetation
falling into one of the ecological categories — would be a measure of the funding sources of
the Maoists from the district at a point in time. Insofar the price movements in timber in
India are independent of the aid disbursements/targetted transfers in Nepal (our outcome
variables), such a weighted index would be exogenous and hence allow for improved identi-
fication of the effects. The results from our IV analysis re-enforces and in fact strengthens
our basic findings.
All in all, our empirical results strongly corroborate with our theoretical predictions.
Our work relates in different ways to several strands of the relatively recent but growing
literature on conflict.10 It adds to the literature on the relationship between economic condi-
tions and warfare (see e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Bates, Greif, and Singh (2002),
Chassang and Padro-i Miquel (2009), Esteban and Ray (1999), Esteban and Ray (2008),
Gawande, Kapur, and Satyanath (2012), Grossman (1991), Grossman and Kim (1995), Hir-
shleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1992)). In terms of linking the budget size to conflict intensity our
10See the survey by ? for an overview of the literature on civil wars.
4
model speaks to the conflict and state capacity issue raised by Fearon and Laitin (2003).11
Our model shares some similarities with Besley and Persson (2010) who study why weak
states are often plagued by civil disorder which reinforce low investments in legal and fiscal
capacity.12 In focussing on foreign aid and conflict, our paper relates to Dube and Naidu
(2015) who find that US military assistance leads to differential increases in attacks by
paramilitaries in Colombia.
Our result concerning poorer districts supplying more effort for the Maoists resonate with
Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998, 2001, 2002) who argue that civil wars are essentially driven by
poor economic opportunities. Like Dube and Vargas (2013) and Mitra and Ray (2014), we
touch upon the “opportunity cost effect” and “rapacity effect” albeit from a slightly different
standpoint. Lind, Moene, and Willumsen (2014) examine the effect of conflict on illegal
activities like opium production in the context of Afghanistan. They argue that conflict
affects general lawlessness in states where instituions are weak and this induces farmers to
switch from foodgrain cultivation to crops (like opium) which may be illegal but provide
ready money. Like in our paper, they too focus on how conflict affects incentives.
Our paper shares certain similarities with papers which focus on Nepal, particularly, Do
and Iyer (2010), Acharya (2009), Gates and Murshed (2005), Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal
(2006) and Bohara, Gawande, and Nepal (2011). Acharya (2009) finds geography and the
history of political activism to be relevant for violence. Gates and Murshed (2005) find a
strong association between the Gini and conflict. Bohara, Gawande, and Nepal (2011) find
strong evidence that greater inequality escalates deadly violence. However, it matters how
one measures inequality: polarization turns out to be the more persistent type of inequality
causing conflict. Sharma (2006) states that the failure of development efforts in Nepal
contributed to a rise in poverty and rural-urban inequality. This, in turn, fueled frustration
among the disadvantaged youth in the rural and remote areas, leading to the eruption of the
civil war. In sum, these studies provide evidence on variables associated with the origin and
escalation of Maoist violence in Nepal; this feature distinguishes them from our work which
tries to identify the effects of conflict on resource allocation.
De Juan and Pierskalla (2016) investigate the role of violence in shaping the trust citizens
have in their national government. They utilise geo-referenced survey data joined with village
level information on civil war casualties to estimate the effects of exposure to violence on
political trust in Nepal. They uncover that exposure to violence matters for reducing trust
in the national government.
Libois (2016) poses a question which is close to ours in some ways. He looks at the short and
11They argue that the main routes that link poverty and civil war are low repressive capabilities resulting
from weak armies and bad road connectivity.
12In a related paper, Besley and Persson (2011) study which political and economic factors drive one-sided
or two-sided violence (repression as opposed to civil war). Powell (2004) approaches the issue of how power
is used inefficiently (e.g., by means of open conflict as opposed to peaceful bargaining) when information is
complete. Our setup also involves complete information though bargaining is not an option for the players.
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medium term consequences of the Nepalese civil war on rural households livelihoods and on
the inter-group distribution of income. He finds that in the short-run all households lose, but
high castes by a larger extent. However, high castes diversify their income sources, notably
by relying on migration, which allows them to recover. He does not explore the political-
economy mechanism which we seek to emphasize: namely, the strategic role of conflict in
diverting resources across districts ex-post.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
designed to address our main questions. Section 3 describes the data, the empirical strategy
and findings and Section 4 concludes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 Theory
2.1 Basic Setup
Prior to the Maoist conflict, the de facto head of the government was the monarchy. The
political history of Nepal confirms this.13 We denote the incumbent head of government by
K (for ‘King’). The potential challenger is the Maoist group, denoted by M . Let the entire
country be partitioned into (administrative) districts and let the total number of districts
be N ≥ 2. The income distribution is allowed to vary across districts; in particular, let yi
denote the average per-capita income in district i. One should think of yi as being net of
taxes. The districts are assumed to be identical in all other respects. This abstraction is
simply in order to bring certain links — specifically those between the economic prosperity
of a district, it’s participation in the Maoist conflict, and the subsequent allocation of funds
for reconstruction post-conflict — into sharper focus.
Why do either K or M want to stay at the helm of the government? We take the position
that there are “rents” from holding office. These rents may take the shape of economic gains
made possible from holding the reins of power. Specifically, there is an amount of money
13In 1951, late King Tribhuvan brought democracy to Nepal. Then, two major political parties - Nepali
Congress Party and the Communist Party of Nepal - emerged and they forced the King to declare parlia-
mentary elections leading to the establishment of the first democratically elected government in 1959. With
the death of King Tribhuvan, his son late King Mahendra overthrew the democratically elected government,
curtailed political freedom and outlawed opposition parties by restoring a single party system known as the
Panchayat System in December 1960. Under this system, the King kept all executive powers and people
around him enjoyed privileges which promoted lack of transparency and favoritism. The late King Birendra,
who came to the throne after the death of his father King Mahendra in 1972, continued with the Panchayat
System until the political agitation of the late 1980s which forced him to give way to a multi-party democracy
in 1990 and became a constitutional monarch. With the re-instatement of multiparty democracy, people’s
expectations rose and there was widespread perception that they will have a fair go in the democratic process.
Unfortunately, due to institutionalization of corruption, nepotism, and favoritism these expectations were
not met as power was still concentrated in the hands of the King and his coterie. While the civil conflict
was under way, the King sacked the democratically elected government twice in just over two years, and on
February 1, 2005 he took over as the head of government (see e.g, Sharma (2006)).
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B which can be thought of as funds which can be allotted to the various districts for their
economic development. However, it is also possible to appropriate a part or the whole of B
by the incumbent ruler. Where does this B come from? It is partly arising out of the public
funds raised by the incumbent government through taxation and part of it may come from
foreign investors/donors.
The game proceeds in three stages.14
Stage 1: M decides whether or not to initiate a nationwide uprising/conflict against K.
Formally, M chooses an action a where a ∈ {C,NC}; here C denotes ‘conflict’ and NC
denotes ‘no conflict’. If a = NC then the game ends and everbody gets their default or
peace payoffs (stated below). Otherwise, we move to the next stage.
Stage 2: Here both M and K move simultaneously. Here, M promises an allocation x ≡
(x1, ..., xN) to each of the N districts from the funds B were K to be deposed and replaced
by M at the end of the conflict. Note, xi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ {1, .., N}. Here K makes
two choices: (i) a transfer schedule for each district t ≡ (t1, ..., tN), where ti ≥ 015 for each
i ∈ {1, .., N}; and (ii) total resources contributed to conflict, denoted by RK which represents
the expenditure on the military and must be non-negative.
Stage 3: In this stage, each district i decides on how much support, if any, to provide to
the Maoist side in the conflict. We assume that within each district there is a “leader” who
decides on the allocation of resources for the conflict.16 Call this allocation ri which again
must be non-negative. It is the sum of these individual district contributions that make up
the total resources in favor of M . Call it RM . The outcome of the conflict is realized based
on RM and RK and everybody gets the “conflict payoffs” which are described below.
2.1.1 Interpretation of conflict.
Before proceeding further it is important to state as what we mean by the term“conflict” in
our setup. Conflict should be viewed as a channel to bring about a change in the form of
government; it is not a mere change in the identity of the head of the government. If the
Maoists are able to win the conflict, then monarchy would be abolished (thereby curtailing
K’s influence on governance to a significant degree). The following quote from Sharma
(2006) affirms this:
“The declared aim of the Maoists is to wipe out the bureaucratic-capitalist class and state,
uproot semi-feudalism, and drive out imperialism.”
Notice, there is no guarantee that the Maoists will actually win the elections after emerging
victorious in the conflict. So their promises of transfers xi to district i can be interpreted in
14We discuss an alternative sequence of moves in section 2.3.4.
15We discuss an extension later where ti is allowed to be negative, i.e., can be a tax rather than a transfer.
16This is basically to avoid any free-rider issues. This assumption of a leader or a median voter to
circumvent free-riding possibilities is standard in the conflict literature (see e.g., Esteban and Ray (2008)).
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the following way. These xis are implicit campaign promises by M who the district-members
believe are going to contest in the elections were M to win the conflict. So these promises by
M define a standard which any party must meet in order to defeat M in the elections post-
conflict. We assume that these announcements of transfers by M and K — namely, the xis
and the tis — are credible. This seems reasonable as both players care about their respective
reputations: after all, if M emerges victorious and reneges then the chance of their success
in the subsequent election(s) is substantially eroded. For K, reneging makes the possibility
of a new rebellion more potent: the citizens may support M even more strongly in a revolt
subsequent to any reneging by K.17
2.1.2 Peace payoffs.
In case there is no conflict, i.e., M chooses NC in stage 1, then all players get their default
payoffs. M gets a payoff of 0. All the districts enjoy their respective per-capita incomes; so
district i enjoys yi for each i ∈ {1, .., N}.
For K, the default payoff is the sum of two parts: one is W > 0 which can be thought
as previously accumulated wealth.18 The other part comes from a portion of B which K
appropriates systematically in the face of no potential threats to his authority. Call this ψB
for some ψ ∈ (0, 1).19
It is important to point out that we make a clear distinction between M choosing NC
(thereby dropping out of the race altogether) and pre-emption of conflict by K. In this
model, we allow K to choose his instruments (RK and t) so that all support for M is
reduced to nil. This latter possibility will be treated as a conflict (C) but one in which the
incumbent wins without “firing a shot”. Of course, whether or not such a thing occurs in
equilibrium is another matter; more on this later.
2.1.3 Conflict payoffs.
The outcome of the conflict, provided M chooses C in stage 1, is determined by a standard
contest function. Specifically, the probability that M wins is denoted by p which is given by
p =
RM
RM +RK
17The idea that reputational concerns drive commitment derives from the (unmodelled) possibility of
repeated interaction between the players which is similar to that in probabilistic voting models.
18In a truly dynamic setting with multiple periods, this would presumably be dependent on B from the
earlier periods.
19The exact value of ψ is irrelevant as it plays no role since NC is never chosen in equilibrium by M in
our model.
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for RM +RK > 0. In case RM +RK = 0 the outcome follows from a lottery whose odds are
public information.
So, the expected payoff to a district i in a conflict is given by:
[yi(1− ri)](1−σ)
1− σ + pxi + (1− p)(ti)
where σ ∈ (0, 1). Note, by construction ri lies in the unit interval. The idea is that each
district has one unit of time endowment which can be used for income-generating activities
or for conflict. Hence, ri is the fraction of time devoted to the Maoist cause. We define
RM to be the aggregate contribution, once we sum over all the N districts. To represent
this in monetary terms (after all, both RM and RK will be denoted in monetary units for
the calculation of the relevant payoffs to the players) we let RM = y.
∑N
i=1 ri where y is the
average per-capita income of the whole nation. For ease of exposition, we set y = 1, so we
can write RM simply as
∑N
i=1 ri.
Observe, RM determines the chances of M ’s victory. This implies that the amount of time
spent in the Maoist cause is important for determining M ’s success; it does not matter if
that time input came from a rich district or a poor district. In the conflict literature, it
is argued that conflict requires both “money and bodies”. While this is no doubt true, we
emphasize the “bodies” aspect here and hence the logic for RM being the measure of time
devoted to M ’s cause rather than financial resources.20 This is reasonable in developing
countries where conflict — and therefore it’s impact — involves a large degree of human
participation and often with little resort to physical capital (in the sense of sophisticated
expensive armaments).21
Notice that both xi and ti are the same for every individual in district i. Hence, these are
to be viewed as public goods, albeit “local” in the sense of being restricted within a district.
For M , the expected payoff involves the expected return from winning the conflict net of
any direct costs of conflict which M has to privately pay for. Let χ represent this cost; this
is like an entry fee which signifies M ’s commitment to overthrowing K. So M ′s payoff is the
following:
p(B −
N∑
i=1
xi)− χ.
Intuitively, a higher entry cost (χ) serves as a potential deterrent for choosing C. If χ is
particularly high, then M might choose NC in the first stage, a situation which we feel is not
particularly relevant in light of the empirical evidence. So we assume χ << B i.e. “small”
in relation to B so that conflict is a possibility in equilibrium.
Note, a higher amount of transfers to the districts, as captured by x, may affect the chances
20The total financial resources devoted to M ’s cause is
∑N
i=1 riyi which is typically different from RM .
21See Grossman (1991) and Mitra and Ray (2014) among others.
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of M ′s success but leaves less for M ’s own “consumption”. For K, the expected payoff is:
W −RK + (1− p)(B −
N∑
i=1
ti).
Like for M , providing a higher amount of transfers to the districts, as captured by t, (po-
tentially) increases the chances of K’s success but reduces K’s share of the budgetary funds.
Of course, K also can affect p directly by the choice of RK .
2.2 Equilibrium
We use the standard notion of subgame perfection as the equilibrium concept for this game.
To be specific, an equilibrium (SPNE) of this game is given by M ’s strategy a ∈ {C,NC},
a collection of districtwise allocations by M and K, K’s conflict resource allocation and the
individual district conflict contributions, {xi, ti, ri;RK , a}Ni=1, all of which together satisfy
the following:
(i) Each district’s contribution to conflict — ri for district i— is a best-response to {xi, ti;RK , a}
and {rj}j 6=i.
(ii) M ’s choice of {a,x} is a best-response to {RK , t, {ri}Ni=1}.
(iii) K’s choice of {RK , t} is a best-response to {xi, ri; a}Ni=1.
Given the equilibrium notion adopted, we start by solving backwards.
Consider the problem faced by a typical district i in the last stage. This district takes
{xi, ti;RK , a} and {rj}j 6=i as given. Hence, the problem is the following:
maxri∈[0,1]
[yi(1− ri)](1−σ)
1− σ +
ri +
∑
j 6=i rj
ri +
∑
j 6=i rj +RK
xi +
RK
ri +
∑
j 6=i rj +RK
(ti)
Observe that the objective function is concave in ri and hence the first order condition w.r.t
ri for an interior solution is both necessary and sufficient.
22 Note, this is given by:
(xi − ti) RK
(RK +RM)2
=
y
(1−σ)
i
(1− ri)σ (1)
where RM = ri +
∑
j 6=i rj. Observe, if xi ≤ ti then the optimal choice of ri is 0. So clearly,
the above holds for xi > ti.
23
22Notice that the CES specification with regard to utility from income net of conflict contribution rules
out r∗i = 1. We will discuss later why ri = 0 is not possible in equilibrium.
23Observation 3 below demonstrates that xi > ti for every i in every equilibrium.
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Now, we step back to stage 2. Let us begin with M . Note, M ’s problem takes the following
form:
maxx≥0 RMRM+RK .
(
B −∑Ni=1 xi)− χ
Given that we are in stage 2, χ is already paid (like a “sunk cost”) and hence M ′s choice
of x does not depend upon it. Notice, x affects M ’s payoff through two channels: (i) as a
“payment” made out of funds B, hence decreasing M ’s consumption and (ii) by mobilising
the districts to contribute to conflict, i.e., via the effect on ri for i ∈ {1, .., N}; this in turn
affects the chances of M ’s success in conflict.
Hence the first order condition w.r.t xi in M ’s problem for an interior solution is the following:
∂ri
∂xi
(
B −
N∑
i=1
xi
)
=
(RK +RM)
RK
RM (2)
In equilibrium – from M ’s perspective – the marginal return from any additional transfer to
district i must be equalized across all districts which receive a positive transfer. Otherwise
M could redistribute resources across the districts and gain. So it must be that ∂r
∂x
must be
equalized across all districts who are promised x > 0. This is reflected in Equation (2).
Now we turn to K. Recall, K has two actions available to affect his payoff, namely, RK and
t. Formally, K’s problem can be depicted by:
maxt≥0,RK≥0 W −RK +
(
RK
RM+RK
)(
B −∑Ni=1 ti).
Hence the (necessary) first order condition w.r.t RK is the following
24:
B −
N∑
i=1
ti =
(RK +RM)
2
RM
(3)
The (necessary) first order conditions w.r.t ti for each i ∈ {1, .., N} are the following:
−(RK +RM)− ∂ri
∂ti
(
B −
N∑
i=1
ti
)
≤ 0 (4)
ti
[
(RK +RM) +
∂ri
∂ti
(
B −
N∑
i=1
ti
)]
= 0 (5)
24Note, RM > 0 in equilibrium implies RK > 0. Since by Observation 3, we have xi > ti for every i, it
follows that ri > 0. Hence we have RM > 0 and so there is no need to consider RK = 0.
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In case some districts which are assigned t 6= 0, equations (4) and (5) tell us that for such
districts the term ∂r
∂t
is the same and it is equal to − RK+RM
(B−∑Ni=1 ti) . This is interpreted as the
optimality condition that K sets t in such a way so that there is no gain from redistributing
the transfer amounts across the districts.
This sets the ground for our main results.
2.3 Results
As a starting point, consider the following symmetric benchmark. Suppose M offers the
same transfer across all the districts (call it x) and K similarly offers the same transfers (call
it t) across all of the districts. Can this be part of any equilibrium of this game?
The following observation provides the answer.
Observation 1. For every i ∈ {1, .., N}, xi = x and ti = t is not possible in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is quite straight-forward. When faced with identical “reward–
punishment” schedules (x and t), the incentives of districts to supply effort for conflict (in
M ’s cause) differ by the level of per-capita incomes. When faced with the same lottery, a
poor district is willing to supply more effort than a rich one given that the risk-aversion
parameter is the same. However, what M cares about in equilibrium is to equalize the
marginal returns (in terms of conflict contribution) to transfers (x) across all the districts;
otherwise M could gain by shifting transfers to the district which offers a higher marginal
return. And even though poorer districts would willingly contribute more in this case, the
marginal return to M from their contribution would be lower than that from richer districts
for the same x and t. This is basically what prevents such symmetric schedules from being
part of any equilibrium.
This leads us to the question as to which districts actually supply more conflict effort in
equilibrium: is it the rich ones or poor ones? The discussion above suggests that poorer
districts are willing to contribute more to conflict when offered the same returns as the rich
ones. But given the argument about equalization of ∂ri
∂xi
across districts it it possible that
the poorer ones are actually offered lesser (by M) than their rich counterparts? If that is
indeed so, then it is not clear whether they will end up offering higher levels of support for
M . The following proposition sheds some light on this matter.
Proposition 1. Suppose yi < yj for i, j ∈ {1, .., N}. Then in equilibrium, ri > rj.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Proposition 1 informs us poorer districts unambiguously supply more effort in M ’s cause.
The reasoning behind the result in Observation 1 can be extended to explain this. Take two
districts, i and j with the former poorer than the latter. What is important here is that —
starting from the equal transfers scenario — there is a marginal gain from redistributing to
j and away from i. This redsitribution registers an increase in overall support for M . Hence,
M must set transfers so that xi − ti < xj − tj. However, this difference in net transfers
between i and j is not so large so as to reduce ri to a point below rj. So the more ardent
supporter (the poorer district) is paid a bit lower in the net but not so much lower that it’s
support falls below the less ardent one’s (the richer district).
The next issue that we deal with concerns the cumulative efforts/contributions made in
support of either side: K or M . Of course, K directly chooses RK while RM is not directly
chosen by M . M can only influence the choice of (r1, .., rN) via (x1, .., xN). Also recall that
K can similarly influence (r1, .., rN) through the choice of (t1, .., tN).
2.3.1 Equilibrium without transfers by K
We next ask if it is possible that in equilibrium K sets t = 0 and seeks to counter the
rebellion through the choice of some positive level of RK . Thus, there is no attempt to
dissuade the districts by offering them transfers like M .25 We present some properties of
such a candidate equilibrium below.
What can we say about the chances of M ′s victory in such an equilibrium? In fact, as the
following result demonstrates, RK will equal RM thus make the chances of a Maoist victory
rather even.
Observation 2. In any equilibrium with t = 0, p always equals 1/2. Moreover, RM =
RK = B/4.
Proof. See Appendix.
Recall that B defines the budget, the control over which precipitates the conflict. Hence, it
is interesting to ask as to how the two warring groups — K and M — react to a change in
the size of B. Observation 2 above provides us with an answer in the case where t = 0 in
equilibrium. Both parties invest more into conflict as the “prize” increases.
We now turn to the assessment of gains from the Maoist conflict. We are particularly
interested in identifying which districts gain more than others following the success of M in
the conflict.26
The next proposition deals with this issue.
25Of course, setting RK > 0 is a factor which discourages support for the Maoists.
26Restricting district heterogeneity to income differences makes the comparison sharper though perhaps
not without loss of generality.
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Proposition 2. In the case that M wins the conflict, poorer districts gain lesser in absolute
terms but more in relative terms.
In other words, (i) xi < xj and (ii)
xi
yi
>
xj
yj
whenever yi < yj.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 makes it clear that although poorer districts get lesser transfers in the absolute
sense, they are better off than richer districts in a relative sense. In particular, the transfer
received as a fraction of the initial per-capita income is decreasing in terms of (initial)
per-capita incomes. In this sense, one could call the poorer districts the relative gainers
post-conflict conditional on M winning. This is particularly salient when one thinks of a
national level poverty line and considers how individual districts fare in comparison to each
other based on this line. Set aside what happens to districts with poverty levels below the
national average and focus on the remaining districts. Proposition 2 suggests that these
districts come closer to the national average now; in other words, poverty levels in these
impoverished districts fall bringing them closer to the national average.
The careful reader may point out that it is not xi
yi
which matters but one should consider how
xi fares in relation to the per-capita net of conflict contributions, since that contribution is
made upfront and irrespective of who wins or loses. In other words, the comparison should be
based on yi(1−ri) as opposed to yi. But it is easy enough to address this. Take districts i and
j with yi < yj. By Proposition 1, we have ri > rj. Hence this implies yi(1− ri) < yj(1− rj).
Therefore,
xi
yi
>
xj
yj
⇒ xi
yi(1− ri) >
xj
yj(1− rj)
and the conclusions of Proposition 2 still apply. In fact, we are in an even stronger position
to suggest that poverty levels in poorer districts decline post-conflict.
2.3.2 Equilibrium with transfers by K
K could, in principle, offer positive transfers (t > 0) to the districts in order to discourage
their support to M . Here we examine equilibria of such kind. A natural question which
arises in such a context is: does K offer as much as M to any district to discourage the
rebellion? The following result provides an answer.
Observation 3. For every district i ∈ {1, .., N}, in equilibrium it must be xi − ti > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
So by Observation 3, although the king may try to dissuade the districts by offering positive
transfers in equilibrium, the amounts offered will never be as high as M ’s. Notice, this
result guarantees that ri > 0 (in equilibrium) for every district i thus justifying our focus on
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interior solutions in the first place. The intuition behind the result in Observation 3 is quite
straightforward. Given that K equals M ′s offer of transfers, no district would support M
and hence there would be an outright victory for the incumbent. Therefore, M can deviate
by increasing it’s offer to any one of the districts and by cutting down on the others. This
would register a positive effort in favour of M from this district with the additional transfer
(from M) and no reduction of support from the others (who were supplying nil support,
to begin with). This possible deviation rules out “pre-emption” by the incumbent as an
equilibrium.27
The next result deals with the relative sizes of the investments into conflict by the two actors
M and K.
Observation 4. In equilibrium, RM < RK.
Proof. See Appendix.
In such an equilibrium, the chances of M ′s victory are lower than that under the “no transfer
by K” equilibrium (see Observation 2). Here the incumbent is fighting harder — in the sense
of exceeding the challenger’s conflict investment RM — and also engaging in active dissuasion
by setting t > 0.
In terms of expected payoffs, it is not clear which one is preferred by K: the former (“no
transfer by K” equilibrium) yields a higher prize — all of B rather than B −∑Ni=1 ti —
but with lower certainty as compared to the latter. Of course, one needs to compare RK in
both scenarios. The multiplicity of equilibria in the latter case makes a comparison difficult.
Specifically, there could be an equilibrium characterised by low xis and even lower tis which
involve RK < B/4 and this would yield an expected payoff to K which could exceed that
under the “no transfers” case. Additionally, there could be an equilibrium with high enough
tis and RK which would make the “no transfers” scenario more attractive to K.
2.3.3 Equilibrium selection
To sharpen our focus on equilibria which are meaningful in a practical sense in this context
(i.e., t > 0) , we make the following assumption. Suppose there are certain costs (adminis-
trative, moral/psychological) for K to providing transfers (tis) to the districts. Specifically,
it is (weakly) cheaper to deliver the same proportion of transfers (t/y) the smaller y is. So
poorer districts are “easier to transfer to” in this sense.28 Notice, this does not imply tj < ti.
27One might argue that the simultaneity in M ′s and K ′s choices of transfers is the reason which precludes
such “pre-emptive” situations. We will argue in section 2.3.4 that this result is robust to a sequential moves
approach.
28One could think that there are costs to finding/conceptualising appropriate developmental projects for
every district. So the poorer a district is, more are the dimensions along which it needs projects, and hence
these costs are lower for such a district.
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It is entirely possible to have tj ≥ ti. Henceforth, we focus on equilibria where ti/yi ≥ tj/yj
whenever yi < yj.
Recall the FOC w.r.t. ri as given in equation (1):
(xi − ti) RK
(RK +RM)2
=
y
(1−σ)
i
(1− ri)σ
By going through the same steps as in Proposition 2, we have for yi < yj:
xi − ti
yi
>
xj − tj
yj
.
Applying ti/yi ≥ tj/yj in the above relation yields xiyi >
xj
yj
. Therefore, even in a t > 0
equilibrium, we can turn to part (ii) from Proposition 2 just like in the t = 0 equilibrium.
Moreover, the possibility that xi > xj exists in this set of equilibria.
29 Thus, poorer districts
may stand to gain even in absolute terms here.
2.3.4 Alternative sequence of moves
Consider the following modification to the game. We now allow M to move first rather than
M and K moving simultaneously after stage 1. So M is allowed to choose (x1, .., xN) before
K can choose RK and (t1, .., tN). This seems reasonable given the general context of civil
wars. After all, the rebel group may first announce their plans of redistribution before the
incumbent can commit to a level of antagonism and (dissuasive) transfers.30
Next we ask — given our modification — what changes obtain in terms of our results. In
particular, we examine whether pre-emptive transfers by K resulting in certain victory for
the incumbent becomes a possibility in equilibrium.
Recall, that K matching M ′s transfer schedule (i.e., setting t = x) was ruled out as a part
of any equilibrium in the original game since a profitable deviation always exists for M (see
Observation 3 and the discussion which follows it). Given this altered sequence of moves,
M is aware that regardless of what it sets x, the incumbent can follow up with an identical
transfer schedule. But recall, one possible deviation available to K in the original game is to
choose t = x and RK = 0. Of course, that would not constitute an equilibrium but it is still
a feasible choice for K. Hence, all the equilibria in the original game are robust to such a
“pre-emptive” deviation by K. Therefore, altering the sequence of moves does not generate
any novelty in terms of “pre-emptive” equilibria. What is does have implications for is in
respect to selection of equilibrium which effectively reduces the set of possible equilibria (as
29In the proof of Proposition 1, it is established that xi − ti < xj − tj whenever yi < yj . However, ti may
exceed tj to the extent that xi > xj .
30Allowing the challenger to move first is in the spirit of Besley and Persson (2010). The opposite, namely
letting K choose RK and (t1, .., tN ) before M chooses (x1, .., xN ), seems less plausible given the context.
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compared to those in the original game).31
2.4 Extensions
Our model is rather stylized in some respects. However it is possible to accommodate several
changes to this framework without any qualitative changes to our main findings. We discuss
three such possible extensions.
2.4.1 Ideology
In trying to keep the setting as parsimonious as possible, we have not accounted for ideology
in our model. In particular, it may be natural to assume that district-level per-capita income
may be negatively correlated with sympathies for the Maoist cause. Also, M may have a
bias towards rewarding poorer districts to a larger extent.
One way to incorporate this would be to assume that there are two shocks: (i) one is
in favour of M which is drawn by every district from some known distribution and these
distributions could be ranked according to some first-order stochastic dominance criterion
and (ii) a similar distribution for M where poorer districts are favored ceteris paribus. Note
that (i) and (ii) effectively work in opposite directions. The former makes it easier for M to
reward the poorer districts lesser while the latter induces M to reward them more. However
to justify such shocks in equilibrium, the net result must be that poorer districts are treated
better — at least in a relative sense — just as in our baseline model.
2.4.2 Within-district income heterogeneity
So far we had ignored any within-district heterogeneity in incomes by letting the district’s
conflict contribution depend only upon the average per-capita income within the district.
However it is possible to let incomes vary by groups within a district and also allow these
groups to make independent choices of conflict contribution; this would not affect the main
results in any significant way. Specifically, let us assume that there is a distribution of
incomes within each district which is allowed to vary by district.
Let ym(i) denote the median income, yl(i) and yh(i) respectively denote the average of the
bottom half incomes and the top half incomes in district i. Therefore, yl(i) ≤ ym(i) ≤ yh(i)
and the sizes of these two sub-groups are equal by construction. Let these two sub-groups
choose their respective conflict contributions: rl(i) and rh(i). Also, let xi and ti potentially
vary between these two groups (l(i) and h(i)); call them (xl(i), xh(i)) and (tl(i), th(i)) respec-
31M has a first-mover advantage here in the sense that it can “select” equilibrium favourable to itself by
choosing the appropriate transfer schedules among the possible ones from the equilibria in the original game.
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tively. In this setup we will call district i poorer than district j if and only if yl(i) < yl(j)
and yh(i) ≤ yh(j). In this modified environment, all of our previous results hold true. 32
2.4.3 Extortion possibility by K
So far we have allowed the incumbent, K, to offer non-negative transfers to the various
districts which are effectively to be financed out of the budgetary funds B. This is akin to
the transfers, x, promised by the Maoists. Here we discuss the possibility of allowing the
incumbent to actually extort in the sense that some or all of the tis could be negative. We
do not make the same extension to the Maoists, since we believe that democracy imposes
certain restraints on the extortionary powers of the ruling head of government.
It turns out that allowing K to impose such “taxes” (negative tis) does enrich the baseline
model.33 In fact, it introduces a new set of equilibria where K sets tis to be negative
and also fights hard in the sense of high RK as compared to the case of t = 0. We also
consider the alternative sequence of moves — like in Section 2.3.4 — where K can make his
announcements after observing M ′s. A detailed treatment is provided in a separate section
in the Appendix. What is noteworthy is that our basic findings as regards Propositions 1
and 2 are unaltered by this extension.
In sum, our model provides us with a set of empirically testable predictions. First, greater
support for the Maoists is expected to come from poorer districts (from Proposition 1).
This implies that violence will be greater in such districts. This is in fact borne out by
existing empirical studies (see e.g., Do and Iyer (2010)). Secondly, it is precisely these
poorer districts who stand to gain the most relative to their original state (in terms of
transfers/implementation of development projects or poverty levels) after the end of conflict
when Maoists assume power (see Proposition 2).34
Next, we take these predictions to the data from Nepal.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
For this analysis we need to combine data on incomes with the data on conflict and data
on aid allocation to Nepal. For Nepal, data on incomes is not available and we use data on
consumption expenditure that is available from the nationally representative Nepal Living
32Essentially the problem is the same except that now instead of N there are now effectively 2N “districts”.
33Though it clearly increases the asymmetry between the incumbent and the challenger.
34Incidentally, our model is agnostic about how the transfers would look like had the Maoists failed. All
we can say is that the aggregate level (
∑N
i=1 ti) would be lower than under M (i.e.,
∑N
i=1 xi) by Observation
3.
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Standards Survey (NLSS).35 Three rounds have been conducted for this survey, the first was
in 1995-96 and subsequents ones were in 2003-04 and 2010-11. So we have data consumption
expenditure from the pre-conflict period using the NLSS-I and for the post conflict we use the
third wave that was conducted in 2010-11. The NLSS is conducted by the Central Bureau of
Statistics, Nepal. The sample size was 3388 households in Round I and increased to 5988 in
Round III. The sample is divided into four strata based on geographic regions of the country:
mountains, urban hills, rural hills and Terai (or lowlands). Using these data we estimate
poverty and inequality numbers for each of the 75 districts in Nepal for the different rounds.
We utilise two different datasets on conflict. The one which we primarily use is the same
as that in Do and Iyer (2010). It is based on information provided in the annual Human
Rights Yearbooks published by the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), a Nepalese non-
governmental organization. We have from this dataset the total number of causalities for the
entire conflict period for each district in Nepal. We have the total number of people killed
per 1000 for each district. We also have this total broken down by the number of people
killed by the state and by the Maoists separately. The toll exacted by this conflict in terms
of human lives exceeds 13,000.36
As a robustness check, we also use data from the Global Database of Events, Language and
Tone (GDELT) Project. This project monitors the world’s broadcast, print, and web news
from nearly every corner of every country in over 100 languages and identifies the people,
locations, organizations, counts, themes, sources, and events driving our global society every
second of every day, creating a free open platform for computing on the entire world. The
GDELT 1.0 Event Database contains over a quarter-billion records covering the entire world
over 30 years (dating back to 1979) and organized into a set of tab-delimited files by date. It
collapses information broadly into date, actors, event and geographical location. We exploit
the data from here pertaining to Nepal for the time period relevant to the civil war.
For the data on the Foreign aid funded projects, we use the data available from Nepal’s
Aid Management Platform. This is a comprehensive source of data on foreign aid main-
tained at Ministry of Finance, Nepal. There is detailed information on foreign aid-funded
projects, their starting date, the funds allocated and the districts they operate in, among
other things.37 However there is some missing information in some of the entries. For some
projects listed in this database either the start date was missing or the amount allocated
was missing. From the specific project documents for such projects, we have filled in these
missing values into the database. From this source we use the total number of projects active
35This is hardly a serious handicap given that the survey is nationally representative. For several developing
countries (e.g., India) such consumption expenditure surveys are used to estimate poverty levels. This
practice is widely accepted.
36The population of Nepal in 1991 was around 18.57 million and in 2011 it was around 26.5 million.
37The dataset is available for download at AMP (Aid Management Platform) maintained at the website
of Ministry of Finance, Nepal. The relevant link is: http://data.opennepal.net/content/amp-aid-data-apr-
17-2014.
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in a district between 1996 and 2006 and then from 2007 to 2014.38 We also use the total
funds allotted to any district.39 Along with this we also use data from the Government of
Nepal on the District Development Allocation for the years 1995 and 2003. These figures
provide us with an idea of the Government’s development allocation to the district.40
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Killed per 1000 persons 0.951 0.991 0.000 5.756
Total Killed by State per 1000 persons 0.624 0.744 0.000 4.673
Total Killed by Maoists per 1000 persons 0.327 0.281 0.000 1.401
Per capita allocation of Foreign aid 1.827 4.193 0.006 22.158
Number of Foreign aid projects 0.503 0.205 0.100 1.100
Per capita DDA 5.957 8.941 1.870 71.530
Poverty Headcount Rate 0.683 0.201 0.164 1.000
Poverty Gap 0.271 0.142 0.037 0.579
Poverty squared gap 0.135 0.095 0.012 0.373
Polarization (Esteban-Ray measure, Alpha=1) 0.027 0.017 0.007 0.108
Polarization (Esteban-Ray measure, Alpha=2) 0.013 0.011 0.002 0.064
Polarization (Esteban-Ray measure, Alpha=3) 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.039
Gini Index 0.271 0.074 0.089 0.474
Atkinson 1 0.122 0.063 0.014 0.345
Atkinson 2 0.210 0.093 0.027 0.516
Generalized entropy 0 0.133 0.075 0.014 0.423
Generalized entropy 1 0.145 0.088 0.014 0.410
Generalized entropy 2 0.194 0.158 0.015 0.761
Polarization (Foster-Wolfson measure) 0.175 0.073 0.043 0.431
Average per capita expenditure 6,801 2,549 3,220 18,191
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (1996–2006). Notes: The information on conflict is from Do
and Iyer (2010). The aid data is from the Government of Nepal’s Aid Portal and the inequality
and polarization measures are computed on the basis of the data from NLSS Round I conducted
during 1995-96. The per capita District Development Fund and per capita allocation of foreign aid
are stated in USD.
Table 1 gives the description of the main variables for the period 1996–2006. From this table
it is evident that per capita District Development Allocation (DDA) is larger, on average,
than the per capita foreign aid allocation during this period. Further, there is on average
38A project is classified as “active” within a certain duration (say 1996 to 2006) if the “start date” for the
project lies within that period.
39First, for the calculation of the foreign aid we exclude the projects that were national in nature, since
we have no way of knowing if they targeted any specific districts. Secondly, among the projects that were
not national but covered more than one district, since we do not know the per district allocation, we use the
average amount per district by dividing the total allocation by the number of districts targeted.
40Ideally, we would have like to have annual budgetary allocations by the Government, however these
documents are not all digitized, so not easily available for all years.
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less than one project (the exact number being 0.503) active in a given year in any particular
district.
In contrast, Table 2 shows that in the post-conflict period per capita DDA is smaller than
per capita foreign aid allocation though both have risen compared to the previous period.
Note, the number of projects increased to almost 20 times of their previous value. Here the
average number of projects financed by foreign aid in a district per year is above 9.6. These
averages are indicative of the fact that in the post-conflict period foreign aid has been a
significant factor in the development in this region.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Killed per 1000 persons 0 0 0 0
Total Killed by State per 1000 persons 0 0 0 0
Total Killed by Maoists per 1000 persons 0 0 0 0
Per capita allocation of Foreign aid 14.019 49.348 0.823 408.456
Number of Foreign aid projects 9.676 2.993 5.000 20.571
Per capita DDA 11.325 20.010 3.070 165.320
Poverty Headcount Rate 0.352 0.175 0.046 0.824
Poverty Gap 0.072 0.056 0.004 0.255
Poverty squared gap 0.025 0.025 0.001 0.131
Polarization (Esteban-Ray measure, Alpha=1) 0.016 0.010 0.002 0.066
Polarization (Esteban-Ray measure, Alpha=2) 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.037
Polarization (Esteban-Ray measure, Alpha=3) 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.021
Gini Index 0.265 0.054 0.161 0.429
Atkinson 1 0.113 0.044 0.045 0.268
Atkinson 2 0.202 0.071 0.081 0.434
Generalized entropy 0 0.121 0.051 0.046 0.313
Generalized entropy 1 0.129 0.060 0.045 0.334
Generalized entropy 2 0.165 0.111 0.045 0.740
Polarization (Foster-Wolfson measure) 0.124 0.069 0.000 0.420
Average per capita expenditure 5,235 1,193 2,312 8,218
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (2007–2014). Notes: The aid data is from the Government of
Nepal’s Aid Portal and the inequality and polarization measures are computed on the basis of the
data from NLSS Round III conducted during 2010-11. The per capita District Development Fund
and per capita allocation of foreign aid are stated in USD.
Also note that there has been a large decline in poverty across these two periods; the poverty
headcount shows a drop from about 68% to 35% . In contrast, the inequality and the
polarization numbers show lesser change. Note, since Table 2 pertains to the post-conflict
period all (district-level) measures of conflict in this period are zero.
We treat foreign aid funded projects at par with DDA funds which are directly allotted by
the Government of Nepal. That is to say, in our subsequent empirical analysis, we assume
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that the implementation of foreign aid funded projects are, to a large extent, in the hands
of the Nepal government. The following lines from an official report from the Ministry of
Finance (Government of Nepal) in 2014 bear testimony to this (italics inserted by us):
“International development assistance continues to play a significant role in supporting socio-
economic development of Nepal. Lately, the development cooperation contributes about 20
percent in the annual budget and it is the major financing source for development projects
implemented through the Government of Nepal. In this respect, development partners’ in-
formation is equally important for planning, coordinating and effective utilization of the
development assistances ... The Ministry of Finance is putting its best efforts to enhance
aid effectiveness through greater transparency and efficient utilization of development assis-
tances.”
The last line of the quoted text betrays the concern that the foreign donors had been raising:
namely, that they could not get a clear perspective of how the funds they were sending to
Nepal were getting utilised. This strengthens our belief that the Nepalese government had
in fact significant say over the allocation and use of these funds.
We now move on to the details of our empirical strategy for the identification of the relevant
parameters.
3.2 Empirical Specification
Given the data at our disposal, we utilize both cross-sectional and panel data models.
We have a two period panel where we use data from the NLSS I (1995-96) and NLSS III
(2010-11) to get the pre- and post-conflict levels of poverty and inequality. With these
we combine the foreign aid allocation 1995-2005 (for the first period of the panel) and the
post-conflict that is the period 2005 onwards (for the second period of the panel). Since we
are interested in the effect of conflict on various outcomes, a certain amount of lagging is
necessary. Hence for the first period, that corresponds to NLSS I (1995-96) we have zero
conflict in all districts. For the second period, we use the conflict numbers per district as
described above in Table 1; so these vary across districts and are from 1995-2005.
Using these our main specification is the standard OLS with fixed effects which can be stated
as the following:
ydt = αd + γt + βXdt + ρZdt + dt
where ydt is some measure of aid that is made available to district d at period t. This variable
can be either the number of projects funded by foreign aid in that district (averaged over
the years in that period) or it may be per-capita allocation of foreign aid to the district or
the per-capita allocation of government aid (DDA) to the district.
Xdt is a vector of variables that describe the conflict in the district (numbers killed per 1000
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in total, by the state, by the Maoists, conflict events based on the GDELT dataset).
Zdt is a set of time-varying demographic and socio-economic controls and includes the mea-
sures of inequality or polarization. αd represents the district fixed effects while γt captures
the time effect. Here dt is the error term which is clustered at the district level.
It is important to bear in mind that all measures of conflict for every district are zero in the
first period while they vary by district in the second. So measures of aid in period 1 (which
goes from 1996 to 2006) are a function of prior conflict (zero by definition since there was
no civil conflict before 1996) and the measures of aid in period 2 (which goes from 2007 to
2014) are a function of prior conflict (so the aggregate non-zero conflict numbers from the
1996–2006 period). This lagging is necessary as we are interested in the effect of conflict on
subsequent aid distribution.41
One may view this panel specification as a sort of difference-in-differences model where the
treatment is conflict (in particular, the different intensities of conflict). The districts with
zero/low intensities of conflict can be thought of as the “control” group while those with
moderate/high levels of conflict are the “treated” group. Of course, this “treatment” is
not randomly assigned; hence, it is important to control for any pre-treatment differences
between these groups. Earlier studies have identified poverty, inequality, polarization and
geography as being correlated with conflict. So we account for these factors in our regressions
to control for “pre-treatment” differences.
An alternative specification we use is the cross-sectional OLS model in which we examine
how the change in development aid provided to the district is affected by the intensity of
conflict that the district previously witnessed. Here we control for the initial poverty or
inequality of the district. The advantage of this specification is that we can directly see how
differences in conflict levels across the districts is related to directing more resources towards
it. Our main specification here is:
∆yd = βCd + γPd + ρZd + d
where ∆yd is the change in allocation of aid to district d, Cd is the measure of conflict
intensity for district d, Pd is the poverty or inequality in 1995 and Zd is a set of demographic
and geographic controls. Note, d denotes the error term for the cross-sectional specification.
41One could raise the concern that perhaps foreign aid during 1996–2006 was dampened particularly in
conflict-prone districts and hence it would be appropriate to use foreign aid data from years prior to 1996.
However, district-wise data on aid disbursement is not available prior to 1996. However, the aggregate
figures for Nepal suggest that the amount of foreign aid during the years before 1996 was not substantial,
particularly when compared to the period 2007 onwards. Moreover, we try to address the issue of potential
reverse causation by our 2-SLS IV approach.
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3.3 Results
In Table 3 column 1, we first present a result from Do and Iyer (2010) for ease of reference.
Here, we see the positive correlation between initial poverty and the subsequent intensity of
[1] [2] [3]
Replication 2011 data 2011 data
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.042 0.024
(0.030) (0.032)
Poverty rate 1995-96 1.106***
(0.354)
Maximum elevation (’000 meters) 0.067*** 0.013* 0.029***
(0.020) (0.007) (0.010)
Proportion of forested area 1.591*** 0.129 0.231**
(0.502) (0.098) (0.096)
Access to motorable road -0.026
(0.100)
Ethnicity dummies No No Yes
Number of observations 71 70 70
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.142 0.235
Table 3: OLS cross-section: Correlations between conflict and poverty. Col-
umn 1 uses Do and Iyer (2010) data and replicates their result with conflict as the main dependent variable.
Column 2 and 3 have poverty in 2010-11 as the dependent variable. All regressions have the robust standard
errors in parentheses.
conflict which Do and Iyer (2010) emphasized. Notice, this is also in line with the predictions
of our theory (see Proposition 1). Columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 have post-conflict poverty
(measured in 2010-11) as the dependent variable. These regressions suggest that there is no
correlation between the intensity of conflict and subsequent district-level poverty. In other
words, the positive correlation which existed between conflict and poverty measured prior to
conflict disappears when we look at poverty levels in the post-conflict period. So, districts
which were poor had experienced more conflict but their subsequent poverty levels seem to
bear no relation to the conflict intensity they experienced. This, by itself, is suggestive that
conflict may have induced targeting so as to have an impact on poverty levels.
We first provide a visual representation of our baseline specification. Figure 1 contains a
two–way scatterplot with a fitted line where the number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects is
plotted against the total incidences of conflict in the district; this is done after removing
district–, time– and population effects. The basic pattern indicates a positive relationship.
And this is what we test repeatedly in various specifications in the analysis that follows.42
42The Appendix contains similar figures for two other measures of conflict: casualties by the State and
casualties by the Maoists.
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Figure 1: Number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects and Total Conflict. The
vertical axis plots the residual of number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects in the period following conflict after
district–, time– and population effects have been removed. The horizontal axis plots the total incidences of
conflict in the district. So each district appears twice in the figure (once for every period).
DDA Aid Allocation Aid: No. of Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.287 1.343 19.974 19.841 0.836*** 0.856***
(1.116) (1.450) (17.712) (15.815) (0.232) (0.199)
Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.002** 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Headcount of poverty -13.316* 50.408* -1.281
(7.553) (30.001) (1.503)
Ethnic group sizes N Y N Y N Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Adjusted R2 0.305 0.479 0.224 0.344 0.941 0.952
Table 4: OLS Fixed Effects regressions. Sources and Notes: Columns [1] and [2] have DDA
per capita as the dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4] have per capita foreign aid allocation and columns
[5] and [6] have the number of projects as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by
district are given in parentheses.
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Our baseline results for the panel specification are collected in Table 4. The dependent
variable in the first two columns is the per-capita District Development Allocation (DDA).
In the remaining columns it is based on the foreign aid allocations; specifically, in columns
(3) and (4) it is the per-capita allocation of foreign aid and in columns (5) and (6) it is
the average number of foreign-aid funded projects per year in the district. It is important
to bear in mind that the conflict measure is the same (equals 0) across the districts in the
first period and varies across the districts in the second period. Hence, the coefficient on the
conflict variable has to be interpreted accordingly.
The results, by and large, show a positive association between intensity of conflict and the
aid allocation. This is particularly valid for the regressions with the number of foreign-
aided projects as the dependent variable (columns (5) and (6)). The positive and significant
coefficients indicate that as conflict increases within a district there is an increase in foreign-
aid funded projects allotted to that district. This is tantamount to saying that those districts
which experienced greater levels of conflict had more foreign-aid funded projects allotted to
them afterwards.
One needs to weigh the different outcome variables in terms of their ability to capture what
we intend to measure. Both DDA and the foreign aid allocations are allocations and not
actual expenditure undertaken whereas the number of foreign-aid funded projects refer to
projects which are active in the districts. In this sense, the latter is a more accurate measure
of transfers made to the districts. In our view, the concerns of endogeneity are substantially
lower in the regressions with foreign aid variables as compared to DDA funds. Notice, we
lag the conflict measures so as to mitigate concerns of reverse causation in any case. But one
may argue that conflict took place — in part — to capture these funds as warring groups
need financial resources during conflict. In this respect, using the foreign aid data (rather
than DDA) is desirable because of two reasons: (i) There was very little foreign aid in the
period before/during conflict while the aid increased substantially after the end of conflict
and (ii) the extent of appropriation by the contesting groups must be lower for foreign aid
as compared to DDA as there is some amount of accountability to the foreign donors.
One could ask how conflict support for Maoists in the theory maps to casualties from conflict
in the data. In particular, one could argue that casualties suffered by the Maoists at the
hands of the State is a better proxy. Alternatively, one could argue that casualties inflicted
by the Maoists actually constitute a better measure. We are agnostic about this and hence
report results for all the three different measures: total, killed by State and killed by Maoists.
Table 5 presents some such regressions estimated with conflict variables that measure number
of people killed by state and Maoists separately. These regressions show that our basic
relation between conflict intensity and aid-related variables are unchanged: larger the rise in
conflict (howsoever measured) over the two periods, the greater is the increase in foreign-aid
funded projects allotted to that district.
Recognizing that inequality or polarization within a district may affect both the intensity
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DDA Aid Allocation Aid: No. of Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Killed by state per 1000 population 1.632 23.481 1.074***
(1.935) (19.990) (0.280)
Killed by Maoists per 1000 population 5.065 79.222 2.989***
(4.680) (56.708) (0.784)
Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.002** -0.002** 0.002 0.002* -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Headcount of poverty -13.330* -12.993* 50.539 54.739* -1.308 -1.050
(7.567) (7.495) (31.630) (30.506) (1.534) (1.445)
Ethnic group sizes Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.481 0.316 0.389 0.951 0.952
Table 5: OLS Fixed effects Regressions: Alternative definitions of conflict.
Sources and Notes: Columns [1] and [2] have DDA per capita as the dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4]
have per capita foreign aid allocation and columns [5] and [6] have the number of projects as the dependent
variable. Robust standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses.
of conflict and the number of foreign-aided projects, we include different measures of such
in our regressions. Table 11 (in the appendix) shows that our results are robust to using
several other measures of poverty, inequality and polarization.
One concern may be that the link between conflict intensity and aid-induced projects that
we document may be explained by a story linking poverty and aid allocation. So, one need
not have the implicit quid pro quo theory that we propose. Specifically, one may argue that
once Maoists joined the government they influenced aid allocation in a manner so as to
benefit poorer districts: simply directing aid to those who perhaps need it the most. Given
the positive correlation between conflict intensity and pre-conflict poverty, this explanation
would be entirely consistent with our reported findings so far.
We try to check whether it is conflict intensity per se which affects aid-induced projects or
whether conflict is simply proxying for poverty. In our regressions (see e.g., Tables 4 and 5) we
explicitly control for some measure of poverty alongside our measures of conflict. It turns out
that the coefficient on the poverty variable is not stable whereas the sign and significance of
the coefficient on the conflict variables is stable across the different specifications. In Table
11 (in the appendix), however the coefficient on poverty is not significant across various
specifications in stark contrast to the positive and significant coefficients on the conflict
variable. These results suggest that it is not poverty via the channel of conflict which
explains the pattern of aid-funded project growth but conflict intensity in and of itself.
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Rather than looking at all the projects collectively, one could divide them according to the
sector (defined broadly) towards which the funds are targeted. So we have divided the total
funds into seven (disjoint) categories: (i) agriculture, (ii) communication, (iii) infrastructure,
(iv) education, (v) health, (vi) institutional and (vii) general development. Such an exercise
serves two purposes. First, we can examine category by category how strong and large the
effects are and in particular examine the sector-wise heterogeneity if any. Next, we are
interested to see whether the effects are largely driven by reconstruction efforts. Once could
argue that conflict-prone areas suffered heavy damages to infrastructure and institutional
buildings (government offices, police stations) and hence it could be rebuilding of these which
is driving our results and not the quid pro quo — story which we posit.
The detailed results for all seven sectors are collected in Table 6. We see that the results
for the number of projects (Tables 4, 5 and 11) are replicated for most sectors except for
three sectors: ‘infrastructure’, ‘institution’ and the ‘communications’ sectors. In the ‘in-
frastructure’ and ‘institution’ categories we see no statistical significance at the 10% level.
This serves to allay our concern that conflict-damaged reconstruction projects are driving
our results. For the ‘communications’ sector we see a significant effect but with the opposite
sign. Specifically, higher conflict resulted in lesser projects pertaining to communication.
One explanation for this could be that the Maoist parties felt that they needed to broadcast
their ideology and agenda to places which they had lesser access to earlier (and hence these
places were involved in the conflict to a lesser extent). Some evidence points towards such a
policy (see Miklian (2009)).
We now turn to the estimates from our cross-sectional regressions. Table 7 contains some
of the main results. In all of the reported regressions in this table, the dependent variable
is the change in the number of foreign aid–funded projects. The main explanatory variable
of interest is Conflict deaths per 1000 population and this is from the period 1996–2006. We
see that districts with higher intensity of conflict had more foreign aid projects allotted to
them. This is true for all the three different measures of conflict intensity based on casualties
(total, killed by the State and killed by the Maoists).
The results are also robust to alternative measures of poverty and inequality (see Table 12
in the appendix).
3.4 Additional robustness checks
3.4.1 The role of elections
It may be argued that the distribution of resources may be basically dependent upon how
successful the left parties were in the elections post–conflict. In particular, in places the
left were electorally successful in relation to their pre-conflict position there would be higher
channeling of funds and projects. If the success of such parties were indeed higher in dis-
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[1] [2] [3] [4]
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.692*** 0.544**
(0.245) (0.238)
Deaths caused by state per 1000 population 0.577*
(0.294)
Deaths caused by Maoists per 1000 population 2.462**
(0.933)
Headcount of poverty in 1995-96 -1.272 -2.235 -2.221 -2.413
(2.071) (2.421) (2.441) (2.369)
Linguistic polarization 1995-96 0.754 0.770 0.600
(1.569) (1.582) (1.547)
Caste Polarization 1995-96 0.106 0.269 0.205
(4.256) (4.315) (4.105)
Infant mortality 1995-96 0.028** 0.029** 0.026*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Elevation max -0.544*** -0.541*** -0.549***
(0.132) (0.132) (0.130)
No. of Project 1996-2006 0.256 0.311* 0.303* 0.318*
(0.192) (0.169) (0.170) (0.166)
Population Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 70 70 70 70
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.287 0.278 0.308
Table 7: Cross-sectional OLS regressions.The change in foreign aid (number of projects)
over the two periods (2007–2014 and 1996–2006) is the dependent variable in all columns. Robust standard
errors are given in parentheses.
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[1] [2] [3] [4]
Conflict deaths per 1000 population 0.894*** 0.915*** 0.801*** 0.848***
(0.192) (0.205) (0.217) (0.231)
Left seatshare -0.026
(0.033)
Ultra-Left seatshare -0.049
(0.070)
Left voteshare 0.010
(0.025)
Ultra-Left voteshare 0.001
(0.025)
Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Headcount of poverty -1.099 -1.036 -1.180 -1.158
(1.717) (1.758) (1.721) (1.759)
Ethnic group sizes Y Y Y Y
Population Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 138 138 138 138
Adjusted R2 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951
Table 8: OLS Fixed Effects regressions: Left electoral presence. Sources and
Notes: All columns have the number of projects as the dependent variable. The left parties performance
is measured in four different ways; first, we categorise the left parties into two groups on the basis of their
stated ideologies — Left and Ultra-left. Next, we look at their share of votes in the district and also the
number of seats they won in a district. We utilise the 1994 and the 2008 elections for these measures. Robust
standard errors clustered by district are given in parentheses.
tricts which witnessed more conflict, then our results could simply be a reflection of greater
targeting by the left rather than any (implicit) compensation for conflict–support. We use
data from two elections: one in 1994 which is prior to the start of conflict and the other in
2008 which is after the conflict had ended.
We account for this by creating different measures of left electoral presence. In particular,
we employ two definitions of “leftist” parties: one is a rather stringent one while the other
is more lenient. We call a party “Ultra-Left” if it stood for militant leftist ideology and
in fact were active in the Maoist war. A party is coded as “Left” if it simply promoted
a leftist ideology without necessarily being directly involved with the Maoist war. Note,
only a breakaway faction of the Communist Party of Nepal (led by Prachanda–Bhattarai)
actually took up armed struggle; so such a faction would be both Ultra-left and Left while a
“moderate” party like Communist Party of Nepal (UML) is coded as Left but not Ultra-left.
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Apart from CPN (Maoist), we included the following parties under Ultra Left because they
were legal fronts for more extremist leftist ideology: Janamorcha and Rastriya Janamorcha
(for the 2008 elections) and Samyukta Janamorcha Nepal and Nepal Janavadi Morcha (for
the 1994 elections).
For each of these Left/Ultra-left parties in each election (1994 and 2008), we created two
different variables at the district level: one is the share of seats won by these parties and the
other is the total share of votes won by these parties. These two measures are indicators of
the electoral presence of the Left/Ultra-left parties in each election period.
Table 8 contains some regressions where these different measures of Left/Ultra-left electoral
presence is included as an additional control. Columns (1) and (2) have the shares of the seats
won by the Left group and the Ultra-left group respectively as the political control variables.
Columns (3) and (4) use the shares of votes of these parties. Interestingly, the coefficients
on these variables are not statistically significant at the 10% level in these specifications.43
Notice, inclusion of such variables does not alter our main findings in any way: the coefficient
on the conflict variable remains positive and significant throughout.
3.4.2 Alternative measures of conflict
As mentioned earlier, we also use a second source of data on conflict to validate our results.
This is from the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT) Project. For
our purposes, we created (a subset of) the GDELT database of events pertinent to internal
conflict in Nepal from 1995–2011. The database consists of 37,689 observations44. We use
the following GDELT event codes: 07 (“Provide Aid”), 14 (“Protest”), 15 (“Exhibit Force
Posture”), 18 (“Assault”), 19 (“Fight”) and 20 (“Use Unconventional Mass Violence”).45
Table 9 is the exact counterpart of the table containing the baseline results (Table 4); so
there is a column-by-column correspondence.
From Table 9, we can see that the basic pattern that has been documented so far continues to
hold up when using this new measure of conflict intensity. Moreover, the coefficients on the
conflict variable are positive and significant for not just the number of foreign aid-funded
projects; in fact, it is so for the Nepal government’s development funds (DDA) and the
foreign aid allocations variables as well (see columns (1)—(6)). Overall, this serves to allay
our concerns as to whether the relation between conflict (which we measure by casualties in
the INSEC dataset) and aid was owing to some specific features of the INSEC dataset.
43This of course does not establish that political considerations did not have a role. We plan to take up
this matter seriously in a related paper.
44While the original database consisted of 42,221 observations pertaining to the above-mentioned event
codes in Nepal, only those geo-coded according to the geographical co-ordinate system within the Nepalese
territory have been selected for analysis.
45See the GDELT codebook here: http://gdeltproject.org/data/lookups/CAMEO.eventcodes.txt
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DDA Aid Allocation Aid: No. of Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Conflict (GDELT) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.005* 0.012* 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
Av. Per-capita expenditure -0.000 0.006* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Headcount of poverty -8.241 65.228 -0.498
(6.472) (43.355) (1.496)
Ethnic group sizes N Y N Y N Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 136 136 136 136 136 136
Adjusted R2 0.808 0.817 0.086 0.242 0.939 0.954
Table 9: OLS Fixed Effects regressions: Alternative Measure of Conflict.
Sources and Notes: Conflict is measured using data from GDELT. Columns [1] and [2] have DDA per capita
as the dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4] have per capita foreign aid allocation and columns [5] and
[6] have the number of projects as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by district are
given in parentheses.
We also replicate the results for the sectoral divisions (a la Table 6) to check whether a
similar pattern holds. It turns out that even when using the GDELT data, the effects are
quite similar. The table is provided in the Appendix (see Table 13). Next, we check whether
the electoral performance of the Left parties have any influence on the coefficients on the
GDELT–based conflict variables. We present regressions which are in the spirit of Table
8. Table 14 in the appendix contains some of these results. The coefficient on the conflict
variable using the GDELT data continue to be positive and significant as in the baseline case
(Table 8); moreover, it is true also for the Nepal government’s development funds (DDA)
and the foreign aid allocations variables.
3.5 2-SLS IV analysis
We have so far interpreted our OLS fixed effects regression results as a difference-in-differences
analysis in the spirit that conflict-related deaths is like a “treatment”. To account for the
fact that this “treatment” is not randomly assigned across districts, we tried to control for
various factors which are systematically different in these two sets of districts: namely, the
treated and the control.46 To further move in the direction of a causal interpretation of
46We controlled for various correlates of conflict as identified in the literature. There is no possibility of
checking for a “parallel trends” assumption due to the lack of disaggregated data on foreign aid prior to
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conflict on resource–redistribution, we employ a two-stage least squares IV analysis.
One of the important sources of funds for the Maoists came from the control of timber
smuggling to India (see ICG (2005)). This idea is echoed in the following excerpt:
“The Nepal army and the Maoists needed forest products to maintain their presence in rural
areas. They needed fuel-wood and grazing for animals and timber for construction, whilst the
Maoists needed timber to sell as a source of revenue” (LFP (2010)).
This is precisely the channel we seek to exploit in terms of developing an instrument for our
conflict measure(s) at the district level. The returns from smuggling timber to India would
naturally depend on the prices for the various types of timber in India. Moreover, the ecology
(specifically, the elevation and vegetation) varies considerably across the different districts of
Nepal. However, the type(s) of timber a district can offer is clearly a time-invariant entity.
However, the prices of these — in India — do vary over time. Thus, a weighted index of
these prices at the district-level — where the weights come from the proportion of the district
vegetation falling into one of the ecological categories (more on this below) — would be a
measure of the funding sources of the Maoists from the district at a point in time. Insofar
the price movements in timber in India are independent of the aid disbursements/targetted
transfers in Nepal (our outcome variables), such a weighted index would be exogenous and
hence allow for improved identification of the effects.
The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) has established a
Regional Database System (RDS) that acts as a central data repository for different thematic
areas in the Hindu Kush Himalayan (HKH) region and provides access to these data through
the RDS portal. The map of the ecology of Nepal prepared by ICIMOD provides the digital
polygon data of ecology (elevation and vegetation zones) for the country in 2003.47 This
dataset has been used to assess district-wise spread of timber resources in Nepal. To that end,
the vegetation types in the ICIMOD dataset were broadly classified further into coniferous,
non-coniferous and non-coniferous tropical forests.48 The International Tropical Timber
Organization (ITTO) divides the price of timber into these very same categories (coniferous
trees, non-coniferous trees and non-coniferous tropical trees).49 We use these price data along
with the above-mentioned ecology data to construct our proposed instrument for district-
level conflict.
This brings us to the question as to the partial correlation between our proposed instrument
and the measures of conflict. Say, a rise in the price of the relevant timber types imply
greater resources for the Maoists. But what is the resultant effect on conflict? Does it
increase or decrease? In principle, the effect could go either way. It would depend upon the
1996.
47This is based on the Dobremez Maps series published in France from 1970 to 1985. (Website publication
date of the map: 2014-11-04T15:00:24, Standard Name: ISO 19115:2003/19139)
48The classification has been performed using the ecological tables provided here:
http://lib.icimod.org/record/22584/files/c attachment 178 3632.pdf.
49We are grateful to Francois Libois for sharing the data on the timber prices.
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military strategies of the warring groups. Thus, we treat it as an empirical question which
would resolve itself in the first-stage regressions.
The idea behind our instrument is similar in spirit to the strategy employed in Libois (2016)
but there are some clear distinctions. Libois (2016) constructs a similar variable at the
Village Development Committee (VDC) level and interacts this variable with the inverse of
the distance of the VDC to India. The instrument in his case is this interaction term and
not simply the weighted index which we use.
Now we turn to our results from this 2SLS-IV analysis. Table 10 contains some of the
results. Column 1 reports the first-stage regression where conflict intensity is regressed on
our weighted index ((log) Value of Wood) and the other controls. The coefficient on the
instrument is negative and significant with an F− statistic above the conventional threshold
of 10. This indicates that our instrument is not weak. The negative partial correlation
seems to suggest that areas where the Maoists got access to higher funds/ “deeper pockets”
(through an increase in the timber prices in India) saw a reduction in violence. This is akin
to a “deterrent” effect possibly because the government forces thought best against taking
the battle to the (financial) strongholds of the insurgents.
The second-stage results are reported, in turn, for all three outcome variables: the Nepal
government’s budgetary development allocation (DDA), the foreign aid allocation and the
average number of foreign aid-funded projects. Columns 2 – 4 report the results. In all of
them, the effect of conflict on aid howsoever measured, is positive and significant. Moreover,
it is so for the Nepal government’s budgetary development allocation (DDA) and the foreign
aid allocation variables which is contrast with the previous OLS fixed effects results. Columns
5 and 6 report the results for conflict deaths by the State and by the Maoists, respectively,
for the average number of foreign aid-funded projects as the outcome variable. We note that
basic results are the same. Observe that the F− statistics from their first-stage regressions
are again in excess of 10.
Table 15 in the appendix contains regressions pertaining to conflict deaths by the State and
by the Maoists, respectively, for the other two outcome variables: the Nepal government’s
budgetary development allocation (DDA) and the foreign aid allocation. The results are in
line with the ones discussed above.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the role conflict plays in determining the distribution of economic
resources after conflict has ended. Most studies on conflict have highlighted factors which
precipitate conflict but the literature on the economic consequences of conflict is relatively
sparse. Our study of the Maoist uprising and its aftermath in Nepal aims to close this gap.
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Our theory combines political factors with economic ones to capture some salient aspects
of the Maoist uprising. In particular, we derive that it is poorer districts who are the
bigger contributors to the Maoist cause; this is true even absent of any ideological ties
between poverty-ridden districts and the Maoist group. And more importantly, our model
also delivers that it is these poor “rebellious” districts who stand to gain more — perhaps
not in an absolute — but in a relative sense, in the event of a successful Maoist revolution.
So conflict may not bring about an entire “reversal of fortunes” but will serve to help the
poorer districts in terms of converging towards the national poverty level.
We also examine these predictions empirically. First, we replicate the findings from Do
and Iyer (2010) who have documented that poorer districts experienced higher levels of
conflict. Next, we use data on consumption expenditure that is available from the nationally
representative Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) over several years: particularly, from
years before and after the decade long Maoist war. This is combined with various data
on different kind of district level allocations (for public infrastructure development and the
like). Specifically, we exploit the data on the Foreign aided projects which is available from
Nepal’s Aid Management Platform.
Using these data and performing both panel level and cross-sectional analysis, we consistently
find that districts which experienced higher levels of conflict (during the decade–long Maoist
war) were more likely to have a greater number of foreign aided projects in years after the
war even when controlling for the poverty rate at the district level.
So is this really a “reward” for supporting the eventual victors? Or perhaps the victors
would have targeted the poorer districts in any case, in the spirit of the benevolent social
planner? Our empirical results suggest that the “reward” mechanism seems more plausible
than the “benevolent social planner” story: conflict intensity has an independent effect on
the number of foreign aid funded projects even aside from the effect poverty has.
From a normative point of view, should one despair? While our work does not directly
deal with welfare analysis, we believe that the answer is in the negative. First, it is hard to
argue that greater reductions in poverty for the poorer parts of the country is reducing social
welfare whatever may be the means to secure this. But that said, whether such redistribution
is happening at the expense of overall growth or not is an open question. Secondly, to the
extent that the ushering in of multi-party democracy is beneficial for the expression of certain
political, social and economic freedoms, such “conflict” may not be outright detrimental.
Hence, compensation for the conflict–contributors may well be justified. Of course, the
question as to whether clientelistic relations will develop between elements of the Maoist
groups and their supporters from these “core” districts remains unanswered. These questions,
among others, remain open to further probing.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Observation 1: First, we show that xi− ti = 0 for every i ∈ {1, .., N} is not possible
in equilibrium.
Suppose it is true. Then ri = 0 for every i. Hence, p = 0. But then M can gain by the
following deviation: pick any i such that xi > 0. Clealry, there must be at least one such i
otherwise M can gain by setting some xi > 0. W.l.o.g. suppose i = 1. Now set x1 = 0 and
increase the transfer of district 2 by the amount x1. This will make r2 > 0 while leaving all
other ris unaffected and hence result in p > 0. This contradiction establishes that xi− ti = 0
for every i ∈ {1, .., N} is not possible in equilibrium.
Also note that xi − ti < 0 for any district i cannot be part of any equilibrium since K can
deviate to xi − ti = 0 and gain.
So we can restrict attention to xi = x and ti = t such that x − t > 0. Now suppose there
exist such x and t such that this is part of an equilibrium. This implies that the FOC w.r.t
ri for every i becomes (see equation (1)):
(x− t) RK
(RK +RM)2
=
y
(1−σ)
i
(1− ri)σ (6)
Differentiating both sides of the above equation w.r.t. x yields:
RK
(RK +RM)2
− 2(x− t)∂ri
∂x
RK
(RK +RM)3
= σ
∂ri
∂x
y
(1−σ)
i
(1− ri)σ+1
Using the relation in equation (6) and re-arranging terms, we get:
∂ri
∂x
[
2
RK +RM
+
σ
1− ri
]
=
1
x− t
This implies if ri > rj then it must be that
∂ri
∂x
<
∂rj
∂x
.
But this violates the equilibrium condition (consult equation (2)) that ∂ri
∂x
must be equalized
across all i since xi = x > 0. Therefore, it must be that ri is also equalized across all i.
However, take any yi, yj such that yi 6= yj. Then by equation (6), ri 6= rj. This leads to a
contradiction and hence establishes the observation.
Proof of Proposition 1: Start with the FOC w.r.t ri which is given by equation (1). Differ-
entiating both sides of the above equation w.r.t. xi and re-arranging terms yields:
∂ri
∂xi
[
2
RK +RM
+
σ
1− ri
]
=
1
xi − ti (7)
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Next, we claim that yi < yj implies xi − ti < xj − tj in equilibrium.
Suppose not; i.e., xi − ti ≥ xj − tj. In equilibrium, ∂ri∂xi =
∂rj
∂xj
since xi, xj > 0. This implies
2
RK +RM
+
σ
1− ri ≤
2
RK +RM
+
σ
1− rj
which leads to ri ≤ rj. Recall, the FOC w.r.t rn for n = i, j (see equation (1)). These jointly
imply
y
(1−σ)
i
(1− ri)σ ≥
y
(1−σ)
j
(1− rj)σ
by xi − ti ≥ xj − tj. Since yi < yj, it must be that ri > rj for the above relation to hold.
But this leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, it must be that xi − ti < xj − tj in equilibrium.
Using this relation in equation (7) for i and j respectively and invoking ∂ri
∂xi
=
∂rj
∂xj
yields
ri > rj thus completing the proof.
Proof of Observation 2: Start with the FOC w.r.t ri which in this case takes the following
form:
(1− ri)σ
ri +
∑
j 6=i rj
=
B
xi
.
y
(1−σ)
i
RK
(8)
Differentiating both sides of the above equation w.r.t. xi and re-arranging terms yields:
∂ri
∂xi
[
(1− ri)σ
RM
+
σ(1− ri)σ
1− ri
]
=
B.RM
x2i
.
y
(1−σ)
i
RK
=
(1− ri)σ
xi
where the last equality follows from equation (8). Hence,
∂ri
∂xi
[
1
RM
+
σ
1− ri
]
=
1
xi
.
Compare this with equation (7) while setting ti = 0. Since they must both hold, it must be
that 2
RK+RM
= 1
RM
. This yields RK = RM and hence p =
1
2
.
Since B = (RK+RM )
2
RM
and RK = RM , we get RK = RM = B/4.
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (i) is immediate from the arguments already made in the proof
of Proposition 1.
For part (ii), note that xi is pinned down by the FOC w.r.t. ri and hence
xi =
RK +RM
1− p .
y
(1−σ)
i
(1− ri)σ .
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Therefore,
xi
xj
=
(
yi
yj
)1−σ
.
(
1− rj
1− ri
)σ
>
(
yi
yj
)1−σ
since we have rj < ri from Proposition 1. Hence,
xi
xj
>
(
yi
yj
)1−σ
>
yi
yj
where the last inequality follows from yi < yj and σ ∈ (0, 1).
Re-arranging terms yield xi
yi
>
xj
yj
thus establishing part (ii) of the proposition.
Proof of Observation 3: In the proof of Observation 1 we have established that in equilibrium
the following will not be observed: (i) xi − ti = 0 for every district i and (ii) xi − ti < 0 for
any district i. Hence, for any district i in equilibrium it must be xi − ti ≥ 0. Next we show
that the inequality must be strict for every i.
Suppose not. Let there be district j such that xj− tj = 0 in equilibrium. Clearly, rj must be
0, since there is no gain in transfer to district j from supporting M . Suppose xj > 0. Then
M can gain by setting xj = 0; so xj (and hence tj) must be 0. Now consider the following
deviation by M . Suppose M sets xj =  where  is infinitesimally small but positive.
By equation (1), we have ri increasing in xi − ti whenever xi − ti > 0. Hence, for xj − tj =
 → 0, rj → 0. Using this in equation (7) (in Proposition 1’s proof) we have ∂rj∂xj → ∞.
Therefore, M can gain by increasing xj since
∂r
∂x
must be finite and equal across all districts.
This establishes xj = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium and hence completes the proof.
Proof of Observation 4: For any district i, it must be that ∂ri
∂xi
= −∂ri
∂ti
> 0 in equilibrium.
This is clear from inspecting the FOC w.r.t. ri (see equation (1)).
Using this relation in the FOC w.r.t. ti (see equations (4) and (5)) yield:
∂ri
∂xi
(
B −
N∑
i=1
ti
)
− (RK +RM) = 0
Combining the above with the FOC w.r.t. xi (see equation (2)) gives:
(B −∑Ni=1 xi)
(B −∑Ni=1 ti) = RMRK .
Moreover, by Observation 3,
∑
xi −
∑
ti > 0. Combining these yield RM < RK .
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5.1 Taxes rather than transfers by K
The next result, stated in Observation 5, deals with equilibria where K sets t < 0.
Observation 5. In any equilibrium with t < 0, RK always exceeds RM .
Proof. Using arguments analogous to that in the proof of Observation 4, we have
(B −∑Ni=1 xi)
(B −∑Ni=1 ti) = RMRK .
Since
∑N
i=1 xi > 0 and
∑N
i=1 ti < 0, the above implies RK > RM .
By Observation 5, we know that in any equilibrium where K sets t < 0 K also “fights”
harder than M . Therefore, the chances of K’s victory are higher (p < 1/2). Why is that
the case? The basic reason is the following. In such cases, K stands to gain more in case
of victory (B −∑Ni=1 ti > B) as opposed to just B. But this comes at a price: a lower ti
ceteris paribus tends to raise ri and thereby RM . To counterbalance this effect, RK has to
be raised. The opposite logic plays out in M ’s case here. Since t < 0 rather than t = 0, this
tends to push p upwards given x and so M may “cut back” on x owing to this. This cutting
back on the xis coupled with K’s concomitant increase in RK tilts the balance in K’s favor.
Clearly, this is a higher–stakes contest for K as opposed to one in which K sets t = 0.
Observation 5, which informs us that p < 1/2 in any t < 0 equilibrium, serves as an appro-
priate starting point for a discussion of such equilibrium. So clearly, the Maoists are less
likely to win the conflict in this situation.
The result that p is lower here than in any t = 0 equilibrium is perhaps intuitive. The fact
that K chooses t = 0 in equilibrium implies that −∂ri
∂ti
is high enough to discourage setting
ti < 0 for any i. In words, this means that the marginal impact on conflict contribution
(against K) by the district on imposition of a positive tax (ti < 0) is sufficiently high
to overcome the potential gains from the enjoyment of the tax were K to prevail in the
conflict. Hence, K chooses to affect the conflict outcome via RK while “soft-pedalling” on
the imposition of taxes. Observe, t < 0 rather than t = 0 implies a higher p (M ’s chances
of victory) for a given level of RK .
50 So setting t = 0 enables K to reduce RK without
adversely affecting p. Such a strategy may be optimal when K perceives that M ′s chances
of victory are sufficiently high and hence wants to cut back on his cost of conflict (captured
by RK).
50Since a lower t tends to raise RM .
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5.1.1 Alternative sequence of moves with K choosing taxes
In line with the discussion in Section 2.3.4, we allow M to announce its transfer schedule
first and then let K follow up with his announcement of t and RK . Now we ask — given
this modification — whether any of the main insights change as compared to the baseline
model. Pre-emptive behaviour by K is ruled out on the same grounds as before. Again, any
salient difference would be in terms of the selection of equilibrium driven by M ′s first-mover
advantage. A categorisation in this regard is made difficult by the fact that K and M are
not engaged in a zero-sum game.
We utilise the same equilibrium selection criteria as in Section 2.3.3. So we have that:
−ti/yi ≤ −tj/yj whenever yi < yj.
Here of course, the interpretation changes. This is now consistent with the idea that poorer
districts are harder to tax (rather than “easier to transfer to” in the baseline model).
Once this is in place, we are able to invoke Proposition 2 as in the baseline model.
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Figure 2: Number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects and Conflict (deaths by
State). The vertical axis plots the residual of number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects in the period
following conflict after district–, time– and population effects have been removed. The horizontal axis plots
the total casualties caused by the State in the district. So each district appears twice in the figure (once for
every period).
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Figure 3: Number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects and Conflict (deaths by
Maoists). The vertical axis plots the residual of number of Foreign Aid-funded Projects in the period
following conflict after district–, time– and population effects have been removed. The horizontal axis plots
the total casualties caused by the Maoists in the district. So each district appears twice in the figure (once
for every period).
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DDA Aid Allocation Aid: No. of Projects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Conflict (GDELT) 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012* 0.012* 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
Left seatshare -0.219** -1.583 -0.019
(0.109) (1.165) (0.032)
Ultra-Left seatshare -0.160 0.363 -0.021
(0.228) (0.799) (0.075)
Av. per-capita expenditure -0.000 -0.000 0.008* 0.006* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Headcount of poverty -8.645 -8.725 77.352 71.453 -0.171 -0.153
(6.721) (6.763) (49.548) (47.646) (1.689) (1.720)
Ethnic group sizes Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 134 134 134 134 134 134
Adjusted R2 0.832 0.818 0.300 0.240 0.953 0.953
Table 14: OLS Fixed Effects regressions: Left electoral presence. Sources and
Notes: Conflict is measured using the GDELT dataset. Columns [1] and [2] have DDA per capita as the
dependent variable. Columns [3] and [4] have per capita foreign aid allocation and columns [5] and [6] have
the number of projects as the dependent variable. We categorise the left parties into two groups on the basis
of their stated ideologies — Left and Ultra-left. Next, we look at their share of seats they won in a district.
We utilise the 1994 and the 2008 elections for these measures. Robust standard errors clustered by district
are given in parentheses.
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